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1. INTRODUCTION
The ongoing controversy over corporate liability for human rights
violations' seems counterintuitive today, in an era characterized by the
unprecedented expansion of both rights instruments and global commercial
intercourse. There is a dual paradox in our "age of rights:" 2 while the post-
War "human rights revolution" recognized and gave legal content to
individual human rights, the sovereign state continues to control the
exercise of international legal personality. International legal personality is
the capacity to be a subject of rights and duties under international law, that
is, to participate in the creation of legal norms, to enforce legal claims, and
to be held legally accountable. This problem was only superficially
* Jeanne M. Woods is the Henry F. Bonura, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law at Loyola
University College of Law, New Orleans. She would like to thank Kandice Doley and English Pratts for
their research assistance.
I. The debate has taken place within the United Nations, in the legal academy, and in the
courts. In a major retreat, recent United States Federal Court decisions have ruled that corporations
cannot be sued for violations of international law under the Alien Torts Statute. See, e.g., Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F.Supp.2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Cf Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc.,
552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008). United Nations norms are being developed by Harvard professor John
Ruggie. See John Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, 101 AM. J.
INT'L L. 819, 819 (2007). For academic discussion see Carlos M. VAzquez, Direct vs. Indirect
Obligations of Corporations Under International Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 927, 927 (2005);
Jordan J. Paust, The Reality of Private Rights, Duties, and Participation in the International Legal
Process, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1229, 1232 (2004); Gabriel D. Pinilla, Note & Comment: Corporate
Liability for Human Rights Violations on Foreign Soil: A Historical and Prospective Analysis of the
Alien Tort Claims Controversy, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 687, 687 (2004); Developments in the Law-
Corporate Liability for Violations of International Human Rights Law, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2025, 2025
(2001).
2. See generally Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (Columbia Univ. Press 1990).
3. During the period beginning in the mid-15th century through the 19th century, the concept
of state sovereignty was being constructed in Europe. International legal personality emerged as a
concept distinct from sovereignty in the seventeenth century, in order to allow certain non-state actors,
the German Princes, to participate in diplomatic activities. Although this was after Westphalia, the Holy
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addressed in the human rights canon, while at the same time the dominant
states structured international law and society so as to facilitate the
unimpeded pursuit of profit by global corporations that have the rights, but
not the duties, of international persons.
II. THE WESTPHALIAN CONCEIT
Modern international law is traditionally dated from the 1648 Peace of
Westphalia.4 Under the prevailing-but increasingly contested 5 -doctrine,
Westphalia symbolizes the consolidation of the sovereign state system in
Europe. Accordingly, the Treaty provides textual affirmation of the state-
centered essence of international law and its subjects.6  The state-centric
perspective survived despite the origins of international law in natural law
philosophy,7 which "obliges all men, in all conditions, in all times, and in
all places, in one and the same way."8
Yet at the time of Westphalia non-state actors, in particular global
corporations, were exercising sovereign prerogatives: negotiating treaties
with foreign sovereigns; capturing and administering territory; collecting
taxes; coining money; and waging war with indigenous peoples in Asia,
Africa and the Americas.9 The state did not assert itself as the sole subject
of international law until it became the dominant form of political
Roman Empire remained dominant over much of Europe's territory. Since then international legal
personality has been used both to include and to exclude actors from international legal society. For
example, chartered trading companies were delegated international legal personality to enable them to
play a vanguard role in the conquest of colonial empires.
4. 1 CONSOLIDATED TREATY SERIES 198.
5. See, e.g., STEPHANE BEAULAC, THE POWER OF LANGUAGE IN THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE WORD SOVEREIGNTY IN BODIN AND VATTEL AND THE MYTH OF
WESTPHALIA 185 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2004).
6. Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 42 AM J. INT'L L. 20, 28 (1948).
7. See, e.g., the earliest writings by international legal scholars such as Hugo Grotius,
Emmerich de Vattel, and Fransisco de Vitoria: HUGO GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM (1609); EMMERICH DE
VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW (1758); FRANCISCO DE VITORIA,
POLITICAL WRITINGS 223, 295 (Anthony Pagden et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1st ed., 1991)
(1486-1546); as well as DE POTESTATE CIVILI (1528).
8. John P. Doyle, Francisco Suarez on the Law ofNation, in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 103, 106 (Carolyn Evans & Mark W. Janis eds., 2004). See also, Antony Anghie, Finding the
Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 1, 25 (1999).
9. M.F. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (1926).
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organization after the Industrial Revolution.'o The Industrial Revolution
facilitated the division of the Global South into colonial appendages of
European territorial states, thus strengthening them economically and
militarily while also elevating this organizational structure above other
more diffused polities, such as the Italian City-State and the Germanic
Hanseatic League."
During this period, legal positivism came to prominence, replacing
natural law as the jurisprudential foundation of international law.'2 With its
emphasis on the concentration of power, positivism better accommodated
the increasingly prominent role of the state in global affairs, 3 enforcing a
rigid dichotomy between state and non-state actors. However legal
positivism, with its veneration of state power, lost much of its appeal after
the systematized horror of World War 11.14 In response, natural rights-
based norms were given legal substance in the Nuremberg Charter 5 and an
array of human rights treaties; nevertheless, the post-war legal system
fashioned by these instruments retained the essence of the state-centric
regime: the power of the so-called "civilized" states to grant and withhold
legal personality.
Prominently absent from the Westphalian narrative is the legal
subjectivity that enabled the first corporations to shape the international
legal order. Since the sixteenth century, chartered trading companies had
10. B.S. CHIMNI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 226-27 (Sage Publications
1993).
11. See generally HENDRIK SPRUYT, THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND ITS COMPETITORS: AN
ANALYSIS OF SYSTEMS CHANGE (Princeton Univ. Press 1994).
12. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
13. Positivist theory, asserting that law is the creation of sovereign states possessing certain
"unique, civilized, and social institutions" peculiar to the West, facilitated this consolidation. It was
necessary to "distinguish sovereigns proper from other entities that also seemed to possess the attributes
of sovereignty, such as pirates, non-European states . . . nomads" and corporations. Thus, the doctrine
of territorial sovereignty became paramount. Anghie, supra note 8, at 26.
14. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARV. L. REv. 630 (1958) (providing a prominent example of the postwar debate on positivism). See
also ISSA G. SHIVJI, THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 48 (1989).
15. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S.
279.
16. See, e.g., the core international human rights instruments, including the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess. Supp. No. 16, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess. Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Oct. 26, 1996, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
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been empowered with international legal personality. 7  These corporations
were the means by which European states conquered their vast empires.'8
It was only after the European states had consolidated themselves
politically and militarily-that is, after the Industrial Revolution and the
triumph of legal positivism-that these charters were revoked, the states
themselves claimed sovereignty over their distant empires, and the
corporations were reduced in international legal theory from "subject" to
"object" of international law. 9 Yet many of the rules that today grant
rights to powerful corporations emerged from the practice of these profit-
driven entities20 that are now shielded from human rights law as "non-state
actors."
Thus, in the post-War legal regime international legal personality,
though expanded, was not democratized. While the rights of individuals
were proclaimed in declarations and legally entrenched in covenants, states
retained the power to decide whether these rights could be adjudicated; 2 1
colonized peoples continued to be "objects" of the law as the post-War
institutions embraced patronizing "trusteeships;" 22 and undemocratic and
17. See SIBA GROVOGUI, SOVEREIGNS, QUASI SOVEREIGNS, AND AFRICANS: RACE AND SELF-
DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 68-69 (Univ. of Minnesota Press 1996).
18. LINDLEY, supra note 9, at 91-93.
19. Id. at 109.
20. Under the slogan of "flag follows trade," norms of international law were developed to
protect overseas investors, such as the law of state responsibility requiring "prompt, adequate and
effective compensation" for expropriations. This has become known as the "Hull formula." Secretary
Hull to the Mexican Ambassador, August 22, 1938: "The Government of the United States merely
adverts to a self-evident fact when it notes that the applicable and recognized authorities on international
law support its declaration that, under every rule of law and equity, no government is entitled to
expropriate private property, for whatever purpose, without provision for prompt, adequate and effective
payment therefore. In addition, clauses appearing in the constitutions of almost all nations today, and in
particular in the constitutions of the American republics, embody the principle of just compensation.
These, in themselves, are declaratory of the like principle in the law of nations." See generally Pamela
B. Gann, Compensation Standardfor Expropriation, 23 COLO. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 615 (1985). See R.P.
ANAND, NEW STATES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 102 (1972). A 1991 review showed that, with one
exception, every arbitral tribunal that had considered the issue from 1971 to 1991 had "affirmed that
customary international law requires a state expropriating the property of a foreign national to pay the
full value of that property measured, where possible, by the market price." Patrick Norton, A Law of the
Future or a Lav of the Past? Modern Tribunals and the International Law ofExpropriation, 85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 474, 488 (1991).
21. See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
22. Under the United Nations Charter a Trusteeship Council was established to supervise the
administration of colonial territories, ostensibly to "promote the advancement of the Trust Territories
and their progression towards sovereignty." Trusteeship Council, UN.ORG, http://www.un.org/en/
mainbodies/trusteeship/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2011). See generally Christian E. Ford & Ben A.
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unaccountable financial institutions were endowed with autonomy,
personality, and enormous power.23 Despite the natural law-based human
rights infrastructure, the positivist superstructure maintained the dichotomy
between "state" and "non-state" actor.
The reign of the European global empire was punctuated by two
devastating world wars, signaling the contraction of the global economy.
During this period, roughly covering the first half of the twentieth century,
the ravages of unregulated laissez-faire capitalism-or liberalism-were
challenged and tempered.2 4 Economic conditions and mass movements
forced industrialized states to regulate corporate power and to provide
Oppenheim, Neotrusteeship or Mistrusteeship? The "Authority Creep" Dilemma in United Nations
Transitional Administration, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 55 (2008). See also Brian Deiwert, A New
Trusteeship For World Peace and Security: Can an Old League ofNations Idea Be Applied to a Twenty-
First Century Iraq?, 14 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 771, 772 (2004).
23. As World War II was ending, the Western Allied Powers gathered in Bretton Woods, New
Hampshire, to govern the global economy. They chartered the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (World Bank) to fund post-War reconstruction, and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) to provide short-term loans for countries experiencing balance of payments deficits. Because of
the nature of their decision-making processes, the International Financial Institutions have been
criticized as undemocratic institutions. See Antony Anghie, Time Present and Time Past: Globalization,
International Financial Institutions, and the Third World, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 243, 253-54
(2000). Voting in the Fund and the Bank is weighted according to the financial contributions of the
Members, known as quotas, giving the most power to the richest States. This "democracy deficit"
leaves developing countries with little influence over IFI policies and decisions. The United States
exercises 17.38% of the vote, the largest share of any member. The U.S. is followed by Japan with
6.23%, Germany with 6.09%, and France and the United Kingdom, with 5.03% each. These institutions
have also been accused of unduly interfering in the affairs of sovereign States. This charge relates
primarily to the practice of conditioning assistance on the adoption of neo-liberal macroeconomic
reforms. Conditionality requires countries to undertake market liberalization measures such as
privatizing state-owned enterprises; discontinuing government intervention in agricultural and raw
materials markets; reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers such as quotas and licensing requirements;
shifting to an export-oriented economy; removing subsidies on exports; reducing expenditures on
education, health, and social security. The net result of such measures is the concentration of wealth in
the hands of a few; inability of the rural population to grow their own food; internal displacement of the
rural population through migration to overcrowded cities; growing emiseration of the nation's poor. See
also Susan Park, Assessing the Accountability of the World Bank Group, INT'L STUDIES AsS'N, March
2008, at 253, available at http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p mlaapa-research-citation/
2/5/3/5/1/pages253519/p253519-I.php (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
24. See, e.g., Abbott P. Usher, Economic History-The Decline of Laissez Faire, 22 AM.
ECON. REv., no. 1, 1931, at supp. 3-10. See also Don Mayer, Community, Business Ethics, and Global
Capitalism, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 215, 246-47 (2001).
25. Edward John Ray, The Political Economy of International Trade Law and Policy:
Changing Patterns of Protectionism: The Fall in Tariffs and the Rise in Non-TarifTBarriers, 8 NW. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 285, 291 (1987). See generally Giovanni Arrighi, 2 THE GLOBAL MARKET JOURNAL
OF WORLD-SYSTEMS RESEARCH, 217-51 (1999), available at http://jwsr.ucr.edu/archive/vol5/number2/
v5n2_splitjwsr v5n2_arrighi.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
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safety nets for their people.26 Protectionist trade policies limited the ability
of multinational corporations (MNCs) to penetrate foreign markets.27
After World War II and the triumph of U.S. power, global security and
financial institutions were created under its leadership. 28 A free trade
regime was established under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) 29 that steadily eroded protectionist policies and expanded the reach
of western-based corporations. In the 1980s, the Reagan, Thatcher, and
Kohl administrations implemented policies of "neo-liberalism:"
deregulation proceeded with abandon at home, accompanied by the
imposition of the "Washington Consensus"30 upon debtor nations abroad.
This consolidated the trend of liberalization of the global economy, the
relaxation or removal of local government controls over international flows
of goods, services, technology and capital, and the privatization of former
state functions. Advancements in transportation and communication, like
those that sparked the post-Industrial Revolution expansion, coinciding
with the opening of new markets in China and Eastern Europe, triggered
another globalization.3'
26. Ray, supra note 25, at 291-92.
27. Id.
28. See generally Robert L. Kuttner, Development, Globalization, and Law, 26 MICH J. INT'L
L. 19 (2004). See also John W. Head, Developing the IMF, the World Bank and the Regional
Development Banks: The Future of Law and Policy in Global Financial Institutions: The Changing
Role ofLaw in the IMB and the Multilateral Development Banks, 17 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 194, 198
(2007).
29. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-ll, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194. The GATT was negotiated during the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Employment and operated between 1948 and 1994, prior to the creation of the World Trade
Organization in 1995. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154. The WTO expanded the scope of trade liberalization from goods to trade
within the service sector and intellectual property rights. See generally General Agreement on Trade
Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IB,
Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994); Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects on Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, vol. 31, 33
1.L.M. 81 (1994).
30. The "Washington Consensus" is a neoliberal approach to poverty and development that
promoted the implementation of market-friendly regulatory reforms to counter "protectionism,
government control of investment, and state monopolies in key sectors." Such reforms "replaced state
intervention in markets with private incentives, public ownership with private ownership, and protection
of domestic industries with competition from foreign producers and investors." See, e.g., World Bank
Development Report, WORLD BANK 61-62 (2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/
wdrpoverty/report/Index.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
31. The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights defines
globalization as:
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By the late 1990s, it was widely recognized that globalization
diminished the authority and control of the territorial state over economic
activities by its nationals conducted within its borders.3 2 Once again private
corporations were at the forefront of an expansion of the global economy,
while states played supporting roles.34 This time global business enterprises
also have at their disposal the resources of a network of powerful
multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN), the Bretton
Woods Institutions, the World Trade Organization, a plethora of Bilateral
Investment Treaties (BITs), and regionally-based Free Trade Agreements
(FTAs).
Wielding this enormous wealth, power, and institutional support,
MNCs are able to deploy a variety of strategies to avoid accountability
when their activities cause harm to individuals, groups or their
[cilosely associated with a variety of specific trends and policies including
increasing reliance on the free market, a significant growth in the influence of
international financial markets and institutions in determining the viability of
national policy priorities, a diminution in the role of the state and the size of its
budget, the privatization of various functions previously considered to be the
exclusive domain of the state, the deregulation of a range of activities with a view
to facilitating investment and rewarding individual initiative, and a corresponding
increase in the role and even responsibilities attributed to private actors, both in
the corporate sector, in particular to the transnational corporations, and in civil
society.
Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Rep. on its 18th Sess., Globalization and the
Enjoyment ofEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2, U.N. Doc. E/1999/22 (May 11, 1998).
32. See, e.g., SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN
THE WORLD ECONOMY (Cambridge Univ. Press 1996); THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 3 (Thomas J. Bierstejer & Rodney Bruce Hall eds., Cambridge Univ. Press
2002).
33. Many global corporations have evolved into titans with economies rivaling those of small
countries. Of the largest economies in the world, more than half are corporations. For example, in 2000
Exxon-Mobil's gross sales were $210.3 billion while Indonesia's GDP was $153 million. See Frank R.
Lopez, Corporate Social Responsibility In a Global Economy After September 11: Profits, Freedom,
and Human Rights, 55 MERCER L. REV. 739, 739-40 (2004). Global corporations play a significant
role in shaping the world economy and, arguably, the political landscape. The size of corporations,
measured by sales and the number of employees, is staggering. For example, Wal-Mart's workforce has
grown from 62,000 employees in 1983 to 1,140,000 in 1999. Id. In terms of sales, it is now the largest
company in the world. Comparing GDP and sales, General Motors is now bigger than Denmark, Wal-
Mart is bigger than Poland, and Exxon-Mobil is bigger than South Africa.
34. One way in which states can support impunity is by creating secrecy havens for
corporations registered in their jurisdictions. A secrecy haven can pose a barrier to accountability by
cloaking the identity of the shareholders or personnel of a corporation registered in its jurisdiction, or
otherwise withholding information relevant to a potential liability finding in another state. See, e.g.,
Robin F. Hansen, Multinational Enterprise Pursuit of Minimized Liability: Law, International Business
Theory and the Prestige Oil Spill, 26 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 410, 424-25 (2008).
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environments." Like the chartered companies of the past, today's MNCs
exercise quasi-sovereign authority, like the ability to arbitrate on equal
footing with states.36  They are enabled through state law and multilateral
institutions to exploit and injure not only the peoples of poor countries, but
those of the most powerful states as well. 3
III. NEW/OLD PARADIGMS OF EXPLOITATION AND IMPUNITY
In their dogged quest for profit, MNCs target the most vulnerable
people and spaces. This section identifies three contemporary patterns of
corporate conduct that illustrate the complicity of MNCs and international
organizations: uranium mining in Africa, international arbitration, and the
international plan for post-earthquake Haiti.
The extractive industries are among the most notorious violators of
rights, historically known for violent population displacement;38 murders;39
35. See generally Sarah Anderson, Manuel Perez-Rocha & Rebecca Dreyfus, Mining for
Profits in International Tribunals: How Corporations Use Trade and Investment Treaties as Powerful
Tools in Disputes Over Oil, Mining, and Gas, Institute for Policy Studies Report 7 (2010), available at
http://www.ips-de.org/reports/miningtfor profitsininternationaltribunals (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
36. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
37. For example ASARCO, a multinational corporation responsible for severe environmental
damages due to its smeltering operations in El Paso, Texas, filed for bankruptcy in 2005. The $1.79
billion settlement to cover the costs of environmental monitoring and cleanup and limited compensation
to certain employees "represents less than one percent of the funds originally identified as needed by
claimants." See Mara Kardas-Nelson, Lin Nelson & Anne Fischel, Bankruptcy as Corporate Makeover:
ASARCO Demonstrates How to Evade Environmental Responsibility, DOLLARS AND SENSE MAG.,
May/June 2010, available at http://www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/2010/0510kardas-nelson-nelson-
fischel.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2011). See also Special Investigations Unit: Broken Government-
Scorched Earth, Aired Mar. 8, 2008 (CNN television broadcast, Mar. 8, 2008), available at
http://edition.cnn.comffRANSCRIPTS/0803/08/se.0l.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
38. See, e.g., Theodore Downing, Avoiding New Poverty: Mining-Induced Displacement and
Resettlement, INT'L INST. FOR ENV'T AND DEV. AND WORLD BUS. COUNS. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV.
(2002).
39. For example, Drummond, a U.S. based mining company, has been accused of conspiring
to murder three trade union activists in Colombia. See Anastasia Moloney, US. Mining Group Faces
Trial Over Dead Activists, FIN. TIMES, July 8, 2007. See also Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 392
F.3d 812 (2004), a lawsuit brought against Royal Dutch/Shell, the head of its Nigerian operation, and
Royal Dutch/Shell's Nigerian subsidiary, charging them with complicity in human rights abuses against
the Ogoni people in Nigeria. The suit alleges that the company and its subsidiary colluded with the
Nigerian government to instigate the arrest and execution of a group of activists that were hanged in
November, 1995 after a trial before a special military tribunal which was based on fabricated charges.
See also Osita Nnamani Ogbu, Combating Corruption in Nigeria: A Critical Appraisal of the Laws,
Institutions, and the Political Will, 14 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 99 (2008).
environmental degradation;40 destruction of agricultural lands, subsistence
economies, and marine ecosystems; 41 and desecration of sacred religious
sites.4 2  These extremely resource-intensive industries are inherently
unsustainable. Climate change will exacerbate the destructive impact of
these industries, threatening the very survival of many people, particularly
indigenous communities.
Ironically, climate change is being used as an excuse to accelerate
uranium mining, one of the most dangerous operations. Data presented
before the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, for example,
showed that many foreign corporations have gone to great lengths to
establish uranium mining operations in vulnerable African countries such as
Namibia, Tanzania, Niger, and Malawi. These corporations are creating
significant economic, environmental, and health problems in fragile areas.43
It is no coincidence that companies are targeting countries in Africa-the
site of the notorious nineteenth century scramble in which mining
companies took the lead in colonial conquest"-to exploit weak regulatory
regimes and monitoring capacity.4
In Namibia, for example, uranium mining extracts huge amounts of
water from the underground aquifers, destroying the means of subsistence
of the Nama people. In Tanzania, open-cast uranium mining threatens to
destroy the traditional lands of the Wasandawi people, who live as hunter-
40. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Apr. 20-25, 2008, World
Investment Report 2007: Transnational Corporations, Extractive Industries and Development, at 147,
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2008 (Apr. 24, 2008).
41. For example in the Niger Delta, Shell Oil operations have rendered useless rich
agricultural lands and fishing resources.
42. See, e.g., Indigenous Environmental Network, and International Indian Treaty Council et
al., Submission to the United Nations Universal Periodic Review on the United States of America, Ninth
Session of the Working Group on the UPR, Human Rights Council (Nov. 1-12, 2010), available at
http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/session9/US/USHRNUPRUSA_SO92010_Annex25
Indigenous%20Peoples%2ORights.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
43. For details see U.N. Dept. of Econ. and Soc. Aff. Comm. on Sustainable Dev., Mining and
Sustainable Development, Rep. on its 18th Sess. (May 6, 2010) (presented by Victoria Tauli-Corpuz),
available at http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/resources/res-statprescsd_18_6may.shtml (last visited Feb. 23,
2011) [hereinafter Mining and Sustainable Development].
44. See, e.g., CAROLYN A. BROWN, WE WERE ALL SLAVES: AFRICAN MINERS, CULTURE AND
RESISTANCE AT THE ENUGU GOVERNMENT COLLIERY (2003); RAYMOND E. DUMETr, EL DORADO IN
WEST AFRICA: THE GOLD MINING FRONTIER, AFRICAN LABOR AND COLONIAL CAPITALISM IN THE
GOLD COAST, 1875-1900 (1998); JOHN J. STEPHENS, FUELLING THE EMPIRE: SOUTH AFRICA'S GOLD
AND THE ROAD TO WAR (2003).
45. Id.
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gatherers in the central part of the country.4 6 In Niger, uranium mining has
already contaminated the groundwater, 4 7 and fossil water aquifers-non-
renewable resources-have been depleted. AREVA, a French mining
company, announced officially that its planned new mine in Mali will have
depleted the local fossil water aquifer about the same time that the uranium
deposit will be exhausted-leaving local Touareg people with nothing to
survive on.4 8  In Malawi, a newly opened Australian-owned mine has
already claimed the lives of two workers; the mine and its tailings pose a
serious threat to Lake Malawi, which is a critical freshwater resource on
which some three million people depend. 49  The government of Malawi
acknowledged that it does not have the capacity to monitor the mine.50
These activities have been aggressively encouraged by the World
Bank. According to a 2003 Report commissioned by the Bank:
Since the 1980s [the onset of globalization] the World Bank
Group ... has actively promoted private-sector development in
extractive industries in developing countries by reforming mining
codes, privatizing state-owned enterprises, and improving market
prices by removing subsidies for extractive resources. Attracted
by these incentives, foreign private oil, gas, and mining
investment poured into developing countries in significant
amounts.5 1
46. African Uranium Alliance, Two Statements to UN CSD on Indigenous People & Uranium,
MINEs & COMMUNITIES (May 29, 2010), http://www.minesandcommunities.orglarticle.php?a=10138
(last visited Mar. 26, 2011) [hereinafter African Uranium Alliance].
47. Id.; The level of uranium in the drinking water is approximately 10 to 110 times higher
than the WHO standard. World Hunger Org., Uranium in Drinking-Water: Background Document for
Development of WHO Guidelines for Drinking-Water Quality, at 2 (2010), available at
http://www.who.int/entity/watersanitationhealth/dwq/chemicals/uranium290605.pdf (last visited Feb.
23, 2011). See also Left in the Dust: AREVA's Radioactive Legacy in the Desert Towns of Niger,
GREENPEACE, http://www.greenpeace.org/intemational/GlobaVintemational/publications/nuclear/2010/
AREVANiger report.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
48. Mining and Sustainable Development, supra note 43. See also African Uranium Alliance,
supra note 46.
49. Mining and Sustainable Development, supra note 43. See also African Uranium Alliance,
supra note 46.
50. Mining and Sustainable Development, supra note 43. See also African Uranium Alliance,
supra note 46.
51. Striking a Better Balance, The World Bank Group and Extractive Industries Vol. I,
EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES REv., at iv (2003). The Report adds: "The WBG has encouraged broader
opportunities for development of these mineral endowments by promoting structural reform programs
for the reorientation of governing regimes, improved title registries, and broader guarantees for
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New multilateral institutions like the International Center for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 52 -another product of the
World Bank-are similarly reminiscent of old colonial mechanisms like
capitulations, or consular jurisdiction, whereby Asian and African
governments were divested of jurisdiction over European residents.s3 The
recent surge in the formation of arbitration tribunals similarly strips host
states of jurisdiction over disputes involving foreign investors. 54
Forced to compete for increased foreign investment, developing
countries enter into BITs wherein they agree to settle disputes with foreign
investors through binding arbitration in ICSID and other international
tribunals.55  MNCs have even accessed these tribunals by changing
nationality.
In addition to the humiliating infringement on national sovereignty, the
economic consequences can be staggering for small countries. For
example, in March 2010, an arbitration panel at the UN Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) ruled in favor of Chevron in an
arbitration proceeding under the U.S.-Ecuador BIT. Ecuadorean plaintiffs
had sued Chevron for environmental damage caused by its oil drilling
operations. The panel found in part that a domestic court in Ecuador caused
52. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. The
ICSID Convention is a multilateral treaty formulated by the World Bank to facilitate arbitration of
international investment disputes, thus promoting international private investment.
53. See CHARLES HENRY ALEXANDROWICZ, THE EUROPEAN-AFRICAN CONFRONTATION: A
STUDY IN TREATY MAKING 83-91 (1973).
54. See generally Teemu Ruskola, Colonialism Without Colonies: On the Extraterritorial
Jurisprudence ofthe U.S. Court for China, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217, 221 (2008).
55. See Sarah Anderson & Sara Grusky, Challenging Corporate Investor Rule, INST. FOR
POL'Y STUDIES 2 (Apr. 2007), available at www.ips-dc.org/reports/070430-
challengingcorporateinvestorrule.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2011). "Through an explosion of multilateral
and bilateral trade and investment agreements, global firms have acquired new protections against
government acts that might reduce their profits. And to enforce these new privileges, they can turn to an
arbitration body connected to the World Bank, the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes, and other similar international tribunals." Id.
56. See, e.g., Pacific Rim Cayman, LLC v. El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, Pending
(June 15, 2009). In this case, Canadian mining company Pacific Rim is suing El Salvador under the
CAFTA agreement for $100 million. The company alleges that El Salvador improperly denied
environmental permits for its exploration projects, rendering its investment in El Salvador worthless.
Because Canada is not a party to the CAFTA agreement, Pacific Rim formed a U.S. subsidiary company
in Nevada to access CAFTA's investor-state dispute settlement. See Mining and Sustainable
Development, supra note 43, at 7.
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"unreasonable delays" in resolving the suits, and awarded the company
$700 million plus interest, taxes, and costs.5 7
In addition to the damaging competition among poor states,
globalization has created a "race to the bottom" in which workers in
different countries must compete by accepting lower and lower wages. The
recent disaster in Haiti demonstrates a trend toward the complicity of
multilateral institutions in the exploitation of such natural disasters-which
are likely to increase due to climate change-to enable MNCs to maximize
profits with no regard for victims, the natural environment, or future
generations.
According to the Oxford University economist who fashioned the plan
for Haiti's post-earthquake economy, Haiti's minimum wage of about $3.00
a day makes it "fully competitive with China."59 However, the plan was
actually conceived in January 2009, more than a year before the disaster.60
The highlight of the plan is the establishment of garment industry free trade
zones, supported by a $20 million World Bank loan containing no
contractual commitments to workers' rights.'
With virtually no public education system, inadequate health care,
housing, and basic infrastructure--even before the earthquake-it seems
counterintuitive to propose moving Haiti from a largely agrarian society to
large-scale manufacturing.62 Yet, within days of the January 12 earthquake
that devastated much of southern Haiti, the disaster was being used to
promote a UN plan for drastically expanding the country's garment
assembly industry, which employs low-paid workers to stitch apparel for
duty-free export63 to U.S. and Canadian markets. Meanwhile, the UN
57. Mining and Sustainable Development, supra note 43.
58. John R. Wilke & Brody Mullins, After Katrina, Republicans Back a Sea of Conservative
Ideas, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2005, at BI.
59. See David L. Wilson, Rebuilding Haiti-the Sweatshop Hoax, MONTHLY REV., Apr. 4,
2010, available at http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2010/wilsonO40310.html (last visited Feb. 25,
2011).
60. Id.
61. See Rick Cohen, Rebuilding with Haiti's Troubled Garment Industry, NONPROFIT Q., Oct.
19, 2010, available at http://www.nonprofitquarterly.org/index.php?option=com-content&view-
article&id=6556:rebuilding-with-haitis-troubled-garment-industry&catid=155:nonprofit-
newswire&Ltemid-986 (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
62. Id.
63. See Wilson, supra note 59. See also Nicholas D. Kristof, Some Frank Talk About Haiti,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/opinion/21kristof.html?_
r-2 (last visited Feb. 25, 2011); Paul Collier & Jean-Louis Warnholz, Building Haiti's Economy One
Mango at a Time, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2010, available at httpJ/www.nytimes.com/2010/01/29
opinion/29collier.html?pagewanted=print (last visited Feb . 25, 2011); Thinking About a New Haiti,
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stopped its Emergency Food Program after less than four months because it
decided it was time to provide "cash for work." The main presence of the
UN appears to be as soldiers on patrol, pointing guns at people. They are
considered by many Haitians to be a foreign occupying army.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the challenges of globalization, any attempt to employ a human
rights framework in an effort to impose corporate liability must entail the
following:
1. Framing issues of corporate behavior, globalization, and
climate change in terms of the full panoply of human rights
guarantees: political and civil; economic, social, and
cultural; and third generation rights to a clean and safe
environment, development; and peace;
2. Prioritizing the rights of the historically oppressed,
marginalized, and most vulnerable people, including racial,
ethnic, religious, and other minority groups, women and
indigenous peoples;
3. Elevating self-determination, the first norm specified in the
two foundational human rights Covenants. This entails
emphasizing strategies of participation and empowerment,
strategies that support mobilizing efforts at the grassroots
level; this would include fighting for the recognition of the
right of Indigenous Peoples to require their free, prior
informed consent before states and corporations can operate
on their lands;
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 1, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/01/opinion/
0Imonl.html?pagewanted=print (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
64. According to the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, "All human rights are
universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat
human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis."
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, A/CONF. 157/24 (Part I) chap. II, adopted by the World
Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, June 25, 1993.
65. The right to self-determination is the collective right of peoples to "freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and political development." This right is
codified in Articles 1(2) and 55 of the United Nations Charter, as well as in the first article of both major
human rights covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on economic, social and cultural Rights. This rule has been reaffirmed by the UN Security
Council in resolutions concerning the former Rhodesia, S.C. Res. 183 (1963); Namibia, S.C. Res. 301
(1971); and Western Sahara. S.C. Res. 377 (1975). The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of
Justice relating to the Western Sahara confirmed the validity of the principle in the context of
international law. 1975 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 31-33 (Oct. 1975). This right is codified in Articles 1(2) and 55
of the United Nations Charter, as well as in the first article of both major human rights covenants.
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4. Fighting for the democratization, transparency and
accountability of international economic institutions;
5. Advocacy for enforceable legal norms of corporate
responsibility at both the national and international levels;
and
6. Credible independent monitorinA of corporate conformity
with voluntary codes of conduct.
In this writer's view, such a comprehensive approach is the only way
that a structurally weak normative and institutional framework can have any
success in actually improving the lives of people.
66. The adoption of non-binding standards has been embraced in light of the presumed
inability of treaty law to bind corporate non-state actors. Some scholars argue that a norm of "corporate
responsibility" is emerging, creating "global standards of action for companies." See, e.g., Cynthia A.
Williams, Symposium: Oil and the International Law: The Geopolitical Significance of Petroleum
Corporations: Civil Society Initiatives and "Soft Law" in the Oil and Gas Industry, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 457, 461 (2004). Such standards would arguably give teeth to otherwise non-binding norms
as corporate activities are examined and evaluated by formal, uniform criteria. See James Thuo Gathii,
Good Governance as a Counter-Insurgency Agenda to Oppositional and Transformative Social Projects
in International Law, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 937, 934 (1999). Noteworthy, however, is the fact
that some of the most notorious violators of human rights such as Unocal, ChevronTexaco and Shell,
have adopted such codes and are as well signatories to many other initiatives. Moreover, non-binding
standards are conceptually problematic. Not only do they have the potential to deflect the demand for
mandatory, enforceable norms. More importantly, self-selected, self-defined and self-interested norms
could circumscribe the scope of human rights law applicable to corporate non-state actors. One recent
experience with voluntary codes of conduct illustrates this concern. The Sullivan Principles were
promoted as an alternative to the anti-apartheid movement's demand for mandatory sanctions against
South Africa, and for disinvestment from multinational corporations doing business there. Not only
were the Sullivan Principles demonstrably unsuccessful in ameliorating the crimes of apartheid; the
normative impact of this approach was much more pernicious. The Principles sought to redefine the
South Africa question as one of racial discrimination simpliciter as opposed to a question of
decolonization and self-determination. Thus, the problem could be addressed by measures such as
desegregation of the workplace.
